

*The Message of Bayle's Last Title:
Providence and Toleration in the
Entretiens de Maxime et de Thémiste*

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INTRODUCTION¹

In this paper I uncover the identities of the interlocutors of Pierre Bayle's last book, the *Entretiens de Maxime et de Thémiste*,² and I show the significance of these identities for a proper understanding of *EMT* and of Bayle's thought more generally. Not surprisingly, Bayle, who was one of the most prolific writers of the seventeenth century, died pen-in-hand, revising and putting the final touches to these dialogues. Since G. W. Leibniz's heavy criticism of *EMT* in the *Theodicy*, however, Bayle's last book has not been the focus of much scholarship. There have been several exceptions to this in the literature of the past decade, especially on Bayle's skepticism,³

¹ I am grateful to Thomas Lennon, Lorne Falkenstein, Jean-Luc Solère, Sébastien Charles, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay. A special thanks to Thomas Lennon, who encouraged me to look into the identities of Maxime and Themiste.

² Pierre Bayle, *Dialogues of Maxime and Themiste* (posthumous, 1707); henceforth cited as *EMT*; Bayle, *Entretiens de Maxime et de Thémiste*, in *Oeuvres Diverses* (La Haye: Husson, Johnson, et al., 1727; repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964), 4: 1–106; henceforth cited as *OD*. We learn that Bayle died while writing this work from the foreword, written by Henri Basnage de Beauval.

³ See especially, Stefano Brogi, "Bayle, Le Clerc, et les 'Rationaux,'" in *Pierre Bayle dans la République des Lettres: Philosophie, Religion, Critique*, ed. Antony McKenna and Gianni Paganini (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2004), 211–30; Thomas M. Lennon, "What

but the work deserves far greater attention, since it is Bayle's last word on the central issues that occupied him throughout his life: skepticism, faith and reason, the problem of evil (why a perfectly good, omnipotent God would permit evil), and toleration. While there may be little hope of garnering consensus on a single message to be drawn from the enigmatic Bayle's last book in its entirety,⁴ I argue in this paper that a clear message *can* be drawn from its *title*—that is, from the fact that Bayle brought “Maxime” and “Themiste” into dialogue. This message highlights the importance of *EMT* and provides a new perspective from which to read Bayle's earlier writings.

I begin by asking a question thus far ignored in the literature: who were Maxime and Themiste? After offering several reasons why this question has eluded historians, I argue that Maxime and Themiste were not mere fictional characters, but were meant to represent the philosophers of late antiquity, Maximus of Tyre and Themistius, both of whom appear roughly a dozen times in Bayle's earlier writings. An analysis of Bayle's treatment of these authors in his earlier works, especially the *Dictionary*, shows that Maximus of Tyre represented for Bayle the impossibility of resolving the problem of evil by means of reason alone, while Themistius represented the urgent need for, and the intrinsic value of, religious toleration. I argue that by bringing Maximus of Tyre (the intractability of the problem of evil) into dialogue with Themistius (toleration), Bayle was urging that intolerant theological disputes do nothing to clarify the problem of evil, but are in fact the very source of that problem. When intolerance is seen in this way, as the source of the problem of evil, toleration then becomes the solution to that problem; in other words, toleration becomes a *theodicy*. I take “theodicy” here and throughout to mean any rational justification of God's goodness in light of the problems of physical and moral evil. I am fully aware that the word “theodicy” did not exist at the time of *EMT*, but had to wait for Leibniz's late response to Bayle to be coined. I argue, therefore, that the subtle message of bringing “Maxime” and “Themiste” into dialogue—the

Kind of Skeptic Was Bayle?” *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 26 (2002): 258–79; Gianluca Mori, “Pierre Bayle on scepticism and ‘common notions,’” in *The Return of Scepticism: From Hobbes to Descartes to Bayle*, ed. Gianni Paganini (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 393–414; Gianluca Mori, “Athéisme et Philosophie chez Bayle,” in *Pierre Bayle dans la République des Lettres*, 394–98.

⁴ Thomas Lennon, Richard Popkin, and Gianluca Mori have all advised against attempts to solve the “Bayle enigma.” See especially, Thomas M. Lennon, *Reading Bayle* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 12–41; Gianluca Mori, *Bayle Philosophe* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1999), 9; Richard H. Popkin, *The History of Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 296–97.

message of Bayle's last title—is that toleration is a kind of theodicy. To clarify this thesis, I draw a comparison between Bayle's treatment of the problem of evil and that of Kant in his 1791 essay, *On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy*, in which the notion of “authentic theodicy” is introduced.

WHO WERE MAXIME AND THEMISTE?

In his “Life of Mr. Bayle,” Pierre DesMaizeaux, Bayle's friend and first biographer, gives a thorough background to *EMT*.⁵ This dialogue is Bayle's final response to two adversaries, the rationalist theologians Jean Le Clerc and Isaac Jaquelot. DesMaizeaux traces the disputes back to Bayle's *Dictionary*, especially the articles “Manicheans” and “Paulicians,” which treat the problem of evil—why God allowed sin and suffering to enter the world. Bayle argued that no system of Christian theology could solve this problem, and that from the point of view of *a posteriori* reason, the Manichean hypothesis of two ultimate, warring principles, one perfectly good and the other thoroughly evil, was the most attractive. Bayle's conclusion, however, was that *a priori* reason and Scripture enjoined Christians to uphold the monotheism of their religion against the Manicheans, as well as their belief in God's supreme goodness, but that the only means available to them for doing so was to have recourse to faith. Le Clerc and Jaquelot strongly doubted the sincerity of Bayle's fideism, and portrayed him as an atheist and Pyrrhonian skeptic in their last writings against him.⁶ The charges against Bayle's works and character were severe enough that, even while suffering from a debilitating lung disease, he could muster the energy for a final hundred-thousand-word reply.

What is missing in DesMaizeaux's history of *EMT*, however, is why Bayle chose to write a book-length dialogue (something he had done only

⁵ Pierre DesMaizeaux, “The Life of Mr. Bayle,” in *The Dictionary Historical and Critical of Mr. Peter Bayle*, trans. and intro. Pierre DesMaizeaux (second ed., London: J.J. and P. Knapton, 1734; repr. New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1984), 1: lxxxii–cxviii. All citations of Bayle's *Dictionary* will refer to the Garland reprint of DesMaizeaux's edition, and will give article and remark, followed by the volume and page number.

⁶ Le Clerc's final attack on Bayle, which is the subject of *EMT I*, can be found in Jean Le Clerc, *Bibliothèque Choisie* (Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1968), 10: 364–426. Jaquelot's final attack on Bayle, which is the subject of *EMT II*, is the *Examen de la théologie de Mr. Bayle répandue dans son Dictionnaire Critique, dans ses Pensées sur les Comètes, et dans ses Réponses à un Provincial; où l'on défend la Conformité de la foi avec la raison, contre sa Réponse* (Amsterdam: François l'Honoré, 1706).

once before, halfheartedly⁷), and why he chose the particular names he did for his interlocutors. Bayle's second biographer, Elisabeth Labrousse, improved upon DesMaizeaux's account of *EMT* by providing more details on Bayle's personal history with Le Clerc, but she too left the form and characters of Bayle's last book a mystery.⁸ Bayle's most recent and most thorough biographer, Hubert Bost, is the first to highlight the fact that Bayle gives the last word to Themiste in *EMT*,⁹ which, as we will see later, is a significant detail about the work; so it is surprising he did not pursue the question of Themiste's identity any further.

None of Bayle's biographers has asked the question, "Who were Maxime and Themiste?" And to my knowledge, nobody else has either. This may seem surprising at first. It is difficult to imagine Plato scholars, for example, reading the *Phaedo* without asking questions about the character Socrates: is he represented in a historically accurate way, or does Socrates serve here as Plato's mouthpiece for various ideas on the soul and immortality? It is equally difficult to imagine Hume scholars discussing the *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* without comparing Demea, Philo, and Cleanthes to the characters of Cicero's *De Natura Deorum*, or without comparing their respective positions to the earlier thought of Hume to determine with which character Hume most closely associated himself. While asking such questions seems natural to Plato and Hume scholars, however, there are two good reasons why Bayle scholars have not asked any questions about Maxime and Themiste.

The first reason is the way Bayle employs his interlocutors. Bayle is concerned in *EMT* to summarize and resolve his disputes with Le Clerc and Jaquelot, and to show that his adversaries have not gotten the upper hand. So Maxime and Themiste take turns stating and analyzing the arguments of Le Clerc and Jaquelot, and showing how Bayle has already, or can easily, respond to all these arguments. Maxime and Themiste rarely disagree with each other. They are reporters of Bayle's debates. They undergo no notable character development over 200 *in folio* columns of text, either. In short, Bayle speaks through these characters while granting them little life of their own. There are a few exceptions to this, which we will consider; overall, however, Maxime and Themiste inspire little curiosity in the historian of ideas.

⁷ *Entretiens sur la cabale chimérique* (OD 2: 691–717).

⁸ For her extremely helpful analyses of the Bayle—Le Clerc and Bayle—Jaquelot controversies, see Elisabeth Labrousse's introduction in the Georg Olms reprint of Bayle's *Oeuvres Diverses*, volume 4.

⁹ Hubert Bost, *Pierre Bayle* (Paris: Fayard, 2006), 497.

The second likely reason historians have ignored the characters of Maxime and Themiste has to do with Bayle's first, and only other dialogue, the *Entretiens sur la cabale chimérique*. In the foreword to this work, Bayle writes that ". . . the author of these dialogues did not strain himself very much in giving his two interlocutors a uniform and sustained character. He has attempted, on the contrary, to blur the colors a little, so that nobody will believe that he wished to portray certain people. That was not at all his design, and he would rather pass above the laws of dialogues and expose himself to the criticism of masters, than to give occasion for complaint that he had wished to represent somebody. Thus, to know his mind, it is necessary only to consider the material he examines: the rest was added only to serve as amusement."¹⁰ Bayle apologizes here for the poor quality of his dialogue taken from a literary perspective. He announces that his intent was simply to amuse readers while making the strongest defense possible of his personal character and works. All we should consider, therefore, is the philosophy contained within the work; we should not be distracted by questions about the structure of the dialogue or the characters of the interlocutors, "Philodeme" and "Agathon." Historians have likely assumed that if Bayle had lived to write a foreword to *EMT*, he would have said much the same thing about that work. And so the identities of Maxime and Themiste, like those of Philodeme and Agathon, have been considered insignificant. However, Bayle could not have written a foreword to *EMT* saying that he did not wish to portray somebody by his choice of interlocutors, for he chose names for *EMT* which very closely resemble the names of authors of whom he was obviously fond. This is what I will now show.

The names "Maxime" and "Themiste" sound very much like the names of two philosophers of late antiquity as they appear in Bayle's works: "Maxime de Tyr" (Maximus of Tyre) and "Themistius." Moreover, these two philosophers appear roughly a dozen times each in Bayle's other works.¹¹ While most of the references to these authors are passing remarks or citations of their works, each author has an entire remark devoted to

¹⁰ OD 2: 691a. All translations are mine, unless otherwise noted.

¹¹ Maximus of Tyre: *Pensées Diverses sur la Comète*, sec. 101 (OD 3: 69 ff); *Dictionary*, "Achilles," rem. C; "Agar," rem. I; "Aristeas," rem. C; "Bion," rem. G; "Cappadocia," rem. H; "Paulicians," rem. L; "Pereira," rem. C; "Prodicus," rem. F; "Sappho," rem. G; *Continuation des Pensées Diverses sur la Comète*, 18 (OD 3: 209, f. b). Themistius: *Pensées Diverses sur la Comète*, sec. 47 (OD 3: 35b); *Nouvelles de la République des Lettres*, December, 1684 (OD 1: 178a–180b); *Dictionary*, "Achilles," *in corpore*; "Anaxagoras," rem. D; "Averroes," rem. B; "Barbarus," *in corpore*, rem. G, rem. P; "Donzellinus," rem. A; "Hoelzlin," *in corpore*; "Jovian," rem. C; "Prodicus," rem. D; "Sturmius," rem. B; "Xenocrates," rem. D.

him in the *Dictionary*: Maximus's is "Paulicians," remark L, while Themistius's is "Jovian," remark C. Moreover, Bayle reviewed an edition of Themistius's *Orationes* in December of 1684 in the *Nouvelles de la République des Lettres*. Since both Maximus of Tyre and Themistius are cited by Bayle in his first major work, the *Pensées Diverses sur la Comète*, and since both are cited numerous times in the *Dictionary*, we can claim that Bayle was familiar with these authors early, and fond of them right into his later career. This evidence already makes Maximus of Tyre and Themistius strong candidates for the roles of Maxime and Themiste.

However, until we can explain why these two philosophers were a good choice for Bayle's last dialogue, this suggestion will remain speculative, though still probable on account of homonymy and two dozen citations. To move from homonymy to identity, we must change our question from "who were Maxime and Themiste?" to "who were Maximus of Tyre and Themistius?" in order to discover what recommended these philosophers to Bayle as he set about writing *EMT*. In the last decade or so, excellent English translations of the complete philosophical orations of Maximus of Tyre, as well as of various writings of Themistius, have appeared, to which I refer the reader who is interested in learning more about these authors than what can be said here.¹² For our purposes, what is important is how they were read by Bayle.

Very little is known about the life of Maximus of Tyre except that he "came to prominence" in Olympiad 232 (149–52 CE), and that he "lectured in Rome in the time of Commodus" (180–91 CE).¹³ What we know of this pagan philosopher is that he authored 41 surviving discourses: "The *dialexeis* of the Platonic Philosopher Maximus of Tyre, given in Rome during his first visit."¹⁴ These discourses touch a variety of mainly moral topics, from virtue and Socratic love to proper entertainment. The nature of the gods is a recurring subject, with four discourses devoted to it. As we will see, Bayle was most attracted by Maximus's discourse on the sources of evil, to which he devoted a lengthy remark of the *Dictionary*.

Themistius was born in Paphlagonia around 317 CE. He spent the bet-

¹² Maximus of Tyre, *The Philosophical Orations*, translated with an introduction and notes by M. B. Trapp (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Themistius, *The Private Orations of Themistius*, trans., intro., and annotated Robert J. Penella (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Themistius, *Politics, Philosophy, and Empire in the Fourth Century: Select Orations of Themistius*, trans. and intro. Peter Heather and David Moncur (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2001).

¹³ Maximus of Tyre, *The Philosophical Orations*, xi.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, xiii

ter part of his life in Constantinople, where he was educated in Greek philosophy and later taught philosophy himself. In Bayle's time and today, Themistius has been most well-known for his five paraphrases of Aristotle. Around 347 in Ancyra, Themistius won the opportunity to deliver an oration to the emperor Constantius II. The emperor was pleased, and before long (355), Themistius was a member of the senate. His fame spread quickly, and his reputation extended beyond that of a philosophy teacher, such that Gregory of Nazianzen could eventually call him the "king of words."¹⁵ Themistius remained a prominent figure throughout his life and delivered further keynote addresses to the emperors Jovian, Valens, and Theodosius. In total, 33 of Themistius's orations survive, a mix of political and personal discourses on a wide range of subjects, from whether one should engage in farming to praise of religious toleration. Bayle had access to all of these writings through an edition of Themistius's works which he reviewed in the *Nouvelles de la République des Lettres*.¹⁶

So why would Bayle name the interlocutors of his last work after these pagan philosophers? To answer this question, we must look to the passages where these two philosophers are treated at greatest length by Bayle in order to see what importance they had for him. In the case of Maximus of Tyre, we must turn to the article "Paulicians." This article was and is a notorious entry in Bayle's *Dictionary* since it comprises his lengthiest treatment of the problem of evil. Here and elsewhere in the *Dictionary*,¹⁷ Bayle argued that human reason was incapable of responding to the objections of the Manicheans concerning evil, which were targeted at the unity of God. In short, the Manicheans held that evil was a positive force in the world, and as such, could not be reconciled with the notion of a single, benevolent creator: a second, malevolent principle had to be posited. The Paulicians were a later Manichean sect.

Bayle treated Maximus of Tyre in "Paulicians" for two reasons. First, as a *pagan* philosopher who had treated the problem of evil, Maximus would have interested Bayle, who forwarded and often repeated the thesis that "[t]he Pagans could better answer than the Christians to the objections of the Manichees."¹⁸ Bayle's argument for this is that various doctrines of Christian theology make it difficult to bring our common notions of goodness into conformity with God's conduct, rendering the hypothesis of two

¹⁵ Themistius, *Politics, Philosophy, and Empire*, 5.

¹⁶ The edition of Themistius's works that Bayle possessed was Petavius, D., and J. Harduinus (eds.), *Themistii Orationes XXXIII* (Paris, 1684).

¹⁷ See especially the articles "Manicheans," "Marcionites," "Origen," and "Zoroaster."

¹⁸ *Dictionary*, "Paulicians," *in corpore*, 4: 519.

ultimate principles more formidable. To take an example central to the debate between Le Clerc and Bayle, the doctrine of the eternity of hell forces one to reconcile the notion of a perfectly merciful God with the fact of infinite torment for all eternity (perhaps for the majority of people). The pagans, however, lacking all particular revelation about the next life, were not obliged to invent an answer to this difficulty. Therefore, since Bayle was interested in whether the Manichean hypothesis could be refuted, he often considered the solutions of pagans, as they were the more likely to succeed. The second reason Bayle would have been interested in Maximus was because he was a self-styled *Platonic* philosopher. Since many of the earliest Fathers of the Church were Platonists, the success or failure of Maximus's theodicy would be telling for the prospects of success for the first and most respected Christian theologians in this regard.¹⁹

The prospects turned out dim for those theologians. In "Paulicians," remark L, Bayle argues that Maximus of Tyre fell right into the Manicheans' hands. This remark spans three *in folio* columns, and treats Maximus's solutions to both the problems of physical and moral evil. On the former front, Maximus had argued that "the plague, famine, and other miseries of mankind are involuntary with respect to God, and came only into the work as an unavoidable effect of the disposition of matter."²⁰ All the art in the universe, on Maximus's view, was attributable to God; but as to any imperfections, these were in no way manifestations of God's will, but results of the imperfection of the material with which he had to work. The similarities here between Maximus of Tyre and Leibniz cannot be missed. Already in Maximus there are signs of the doctrine of metaphysical evil, and of the distinction between God's antecedent and consequent wills.²¹ Moreover, these doctrines work together as they would later for Leibniz in his criticism of Bayle. So when Bayle responds to Maximus of Tyre, we receive, in a way, a glimpse of how he might have responded to Leibniz if he had lived several years longer. Bayle asks Maximus this question: "Why did you maintain then that the physical evils of mankind are neither intended nor produced by God? If they are so necessary for the preservation of the whole, and if the artificer aims at the preservation of the whole, he must needs have them in view."²² David Norton has already noted this parallel between Maximus

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 4: 524.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 4: 525.

²¹ See G. W. Leibniz, *Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil*, trans. E. M. Huggard (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951), Part One, sections 21, 22; 136–37.

²² *Ibid.*

and Leibniz, and writes of Bayle that “his arguments against [Maximus’s] Manicheism can be easily recast to hold against Leibniz, another Platonist, and therefore, another Manichean.”²³

That Maximus of Tyre’s principles lead to Manicheism is most clearly seen in his response to the problem of moral evil. Maximus wrote that God, desiring humans to be inferior to himself, placed the human soul in a body, to be like the driver of a chariot. But the human body, like unruly horses, pulls the soul against its will this way and that, and is everywhere the occasion of sin. So it is the material body with all its inherent imperfection, once again, that is the cause of evil. Bayle concludes that Maximus acknowledged two positive and opposing principles, God and matter, and was therefore, in effect, a Manichean. The problem of evil and the refutation of Manicheism thus remained at large, for as Bayle notoriously remarked, “[a] good and virtuous father would never cause his children to ride unruly horses.”²⁴

If the pagan Maximus of Tyre, who was unconstrained by Christian theology and thus free to employ all his creativity, could not resolve the problem of evil, then there was little hope Christians could resolve it by means of reason alone while upholding doctrines like the eternity of hell. Maximus of Tyre was thus a case study for Bayle, and provided a concrete example and proof of his general thesis that the problem of evil could not be resolved by reason.

Maximus was consequently an obvious choice for Bayle’s last dialogue. As we have already remarked, the disputes with Le Clerc and Jaquelot centered upon the problem of evil as it was treated by Bayle in the articles, “Manicheans” and “Paulicians.” In his pseudonymous first work against Bayle, the *Parrhasiana*, Le Clerc claims he considers Bayle’s intentions in the recently published first edition of the *Dictionary* to be free of any malice.²⁵ Bayle presented the Manichean objections so strongly in several articles only to exercise the wit of his theologically-minded readers. Le Clerc claims he is assuming a similar argumentative spirit when he objects to Bayle’s treatment by showing that Origenism, an ancient Christian sect of which Bayle said nothing, could easily respond to the Manicheans. Origenists held the doctrine of universal salvation, which provided Le Clerc with

²³ David Norton, “Leibniz and Bayle: Manicheism and Dialectic,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 2 (1964): 23–36; 29.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Parrhasiana: ou pensées diverses sur des matières de critique, d’histoire, de morale et de politique avec la défense de diverse ouvrages de Mr. L.C., par Theodore Parrhase* (Amsterdam: les Héritiers d’Antoine Schelte, 1699), ch. VI.

an effortless response to the problem of evil: the few and short-lived evils of this life will be counterbalanced by eternal bliss for all in the next. God's goodness is thus saved. In the second edition of the *Dictionary*, Bayle appended a remark to his article, "Origen," in which he examined and refuted all the arguments of Le Clerc's hypothetical Origenist.²⁶ Five years passed before the subject of evil would reemerge in Bayle's debates with Le Clerc; but in the meantime, the two began a lengthy controversy over Ralph Cudworth's plastic natures.²⁷ It was likely Bayle's success in this debate that heated Le Clerc, and caused him to write two articles in his *Bibliothèque choisie*, once again taking up Bayle's treatment of evil, this time arguing that Bayle's intent in the *Dictionary* and elsewhere had been subversive of religion.²⁸ *EMT I* is Bayle's response to these final virulent attacks of Le Clerc.

Maximus of Tyre was equally appropriate for the dialogue of *EMT II*, Bayle's response to Jaquelot, for this latter debate also fixed on Bayle's remarks concerning evil. This debate began with Jaquelot's lengthy and aggressive critique on Bayle's *Dictionary* in the *Conformité de la foi avec la raison*.²⁹ After several hundred pages of preparative material in which the existence of God is proved, the inspiration of Scripture treated, the essence of religion laid out, and free will defended and praised, Jaquelot gets to Bayle's *Dictionary*. The articles "Manicheans," "Marcionites," and "Paulicians" are analyzed, and Jaquelot's own free will theodicy, expounded previously, is defended.³⁰ Jaquelot claims not to "penetrate the hidden intent of this author [Bayle]," yet allows himself this rhetorical question: "If Christianity is established in his heart only upon the ruins of his reason, must he crown it with such praise?"³¹ Bayle responded to Jaquelot, matching his prolixity, in the second volume of his *Réponses aux questions d'un*

²⁶ *Dictionary*, "Origen," rem. E, 416–19; rem. K, 422.

²⁷ For more on Bayle's debate with Le Clerc over plastic natures, see Thomas M. Lennon, "Cudworth and Bayle: An Odd Couple?" in *The Achilles of Rationalist Psychology*, ed. Thomas M. Lennon and Robert J. Stainton (Dordrecht: Springer Science and Business Media B.V., 2008), ch. 8.

²⁸ Jean Le Clerc, *Bibliothèque Choisie* (Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1968), "Défense de la Bonté et de la Sanctité Divine, contre les objections de Mr. Bayle," volume 9 (1706), article III, 103–71; and volume 9 (1706), article X, 361–86.

²⁹ Isaac Jaquelot, *Conformité de la foi avec la raison; ou défense de la religion, contre les principales difficultez répandues dans le Dictionnaire Historique et Critique de Mr. Bayle* in Christian Wolff, *Gesammelte Werke: Materialien Und Dokumente 96* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2006).

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 221–65.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 222. "Si le Christianisme n'est établi dans son coeur que sur les ruines de sa raison: faudroit-il bien le couronner de cet éloge?"

provincial.³² This incited Jaquelot to respond in turn in his *Examen de la théologie de Mr. Bayle*.³³ In Bayle's response to this work, *EMT* II, he deliberately ignores the first 304 of 472 pages of Jaquelot's book, because they treat the freedom of the will, which is, in Bayle's mind, beside the main point. The real issue between these authors is the origin of evil.³⁴

Hence, we can conclude that given the role Maximus of Tyre played in Bayle's *Dictionary*, namely as a case study for his thesis concerning the intractability of the problem of evil, and given the focus of *EMT*, again the failure of reason to explain the origin of evil, Maxime was, with a high degree of probability, Maximus of Tyre. It remains to see why Themistius, who lived several centuries after Maximus, was chosen for his interlocutor.

There are two places where Bayle considers Themistius in depth: the *Nouvelles de la République des Lettres (NRL)*, and the *Dictionary* article "Jovian," remark C. Bayle's review in *NRL* of Petau's and Hardouin's edition of Themistius is detailed and scholarly, highlighting everything in this edition that was lacking in the previous edition of Henri Etienne.³⁵ But first, the review begins with a general overview of Themistius's life and works, wherein Bayle claims this philosopher deserves the highest possible praise. After speaking generally of the esteem six emperors had for Themistius, Bayle recounts this story about the Arian emperor Valens, which I quote in full despite its length because of its role in my argument, and because it deserves greater attention than it has received:

Valens had such great deference for [Themistius], that out of consideration for him he moderated his false zeal which had led him to persecute the orthodox. It is assuredly one of the greatest marks of esteem one can render a man; for once a prince sets his mind to exterminating a religion, everything that delays the progress of this design weighs on him and disturbs him greatly, and only very powerful reasons can delay such a nature. Nevertheless, Themistius' discourse produced this great effect on this emperor, who was driven to destroy the orthodox by the counsel of several Arian bishops, and by the intrigues [*les intrigues*] of the empress. This philosopher demonstrated to Valens *that he was persecuting good people without reason; that it was not a crime to believe and to*

³² *Réponses aux questions d'un provincial* II, chs. CXXVIII–CLXI (OD 3: 760–836).

³³ See note 7.

³⁴ See OD 4: 37b.

³⁵ OD 1: 178–80.

think differently than him; that there was no cause to be astonished at the diversity of opinion; that the Gentiles were much more divided amongst themselves than the Christians; that each person captures some part of the truth; and that it pleased God to confound men's pride and to render himself more venerable by the difficulty we have in knowing him. It is unfortunate that such beautiful words were spoken by a pagan, and that it was necessary for Christians to learn this important lesson from an idolater. Would they could profit from these words again.³⁶

Bayle wrote this passage in the midst of a period which he spent publishing energetically on religious toleration, producing works such as the *Critique générale de l'Histoire du calvinisme de M. Maimbourg* (1682),³⁷ the *Nouvelles lettres de l'auteur de la Critique générale* (1685),³⁸ and his masterpiece on the subject, the *Commentaire philosophique* (1686–88).³⁹ Through his own writings on toleration, Bayle surely dreamt of having the same effect (indirectly) on Louis XIV, who would revoke the Edict of Nantes in this same period, that Themistius had on Valens. In any case, it is clear that in Bayle's most fruitful phase of writing on toleration he admired Themistius and looked to him for inspiration.

It was again in relation to toleration that Bayle discussed Themistius in the *Dictionary*. The article "Jovian," remark C, focuses on the historical accuracy of Themistius's third oration, given to the emperor Jovian. Here Themistius praises the Christian emperor for his toleration of heathens, but Bayle compares this account to that which is found in Socrates the Historian's *History of the Church*, in which we read that all the temples of the heathens were shut down by this emperor. Bayle offers an interpretation of Themistius's oration that saves the sincerity of that philosopher. Themistius was employing hyperbole, grounded on the fact of Jovian's moderation toward certain heretics, which was intended to encourage Jovian to extend this same moderation to all religious sects—a "crafty insinuation."⁴⁰ In other words, by praising Jovian's limited religious toleration, Themistius was trying to shame that emperor into enlarging that policy. As in *NRL*, here again in the *Dictionary*, Bayle focuses on the rhetorical capacity of Themistius to sway persecutors toward toleration.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 178b–179a. The italics are Bayle's.

³⁷ *OD* 2: 1–160.

³⁸ *OD* 2: 161–335.

³⁹ *OD* 2: 444–96.

⁴⁰ *Dictionary*, "Jovian," rem. C, 3: 585

Though religious toleration was seldom mentioned explicitly in Bayle's debates with Le Clerc and Jaquelot, it is clear, especially from *EMT* I, that Bayle saw toleration as one of the key issues at stake. At the outset of the dialogue, Maxime and Themiste identify a turning-point in the debate between Bayle and Le Clerc. Themiste says it occurred when Le Clerc "set himself up as the public prosecutor of irreligion."⁴¹ Themiste then immediately focuses the rest of the dialogue by recommending that he and his interlocutor concentrate on one single question: "Has Le Clerc truly proven that Bayle is *guilty of the crime* of which he accuses him?"⁴² Thus Themiste sets the agenda for the next thirty pages, which read like a legal trial in which the case of Le Clerc, constantly referred to as the "accuser" (*l'accusateur*),⁴³ is analyzed and adjudicated in light of Bayle's past defense. Legal terminology is used throughout: the debate is referred to as a trial (*un process*);⁴⁴ Le Clerc is blamed for not establishing his "charge" (*chef de l'accusation*) in the form of a "factum";⁴⁵ and what is at stake is not truth and falsity, but innocence and guilt.⁴⁶ Bayle's point in portraying his dispute with Le Clerc in this way is to show that his ideas are no longer being refuted by Le Clerc in a sincere search for the truth, as perhaps was the case at the time of Le Clerc's *Parrhasiana*. Rather, Bayle is rather being persecuted by him through a spirit of intolerance.

That toleration is central to *EMT* is also made clear by one of the rare moments in the dialogue when Maxime and Themiste disagree. At the outset of *EMT* I, chapter XIII, entitled "What is the Nature of Le Clerc's toleration?" Maxime recommends that the discussion come to a close, for everything of importance has been treated. Themiste humbly disagrees, saying, "I do not quite share your opinion," and goes on to examine whether Le Clerc can claim, as all Arminians should, that he has always practiced toleration.⁴⁷ The conclusion is negative. Themiste then examines Le Clerc's

⁴¹ *OD* 4: 4a. "Il s'est couvert du beau prétexte des intérêts de la gloire de Dieu pour s'ériger en accusateur public d'irreligion."

⁴² *Ibid.*, italics mine. "Mr. le Clerc a-t-il bien prouvé que Mr. Bayle soit coupable du crime dont il l'accuse?"

⁴³ See for instance, *OD* IV, 5a, 6b, 7b, 12a, 15a, 15b, 18a, 18b, 19b, 22a, 24a, 29b, 30a, 32a, 33a, 33b, 34b, 35b.

⁴⁴ *OD* 4: 5a

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ See, among many other examples, *OD* 4: 10a. "Quelle pitié qu'un délateur soit réduit à dire que la personne qu'il accuse est coupable si elle parle sincèrement."

⁴⁷ *OD* 4: 31a. One of the four articles of the Arminian sect was toleration. For an introduction to Arminian toleration, see Jonathan Israel, "The Intellectual Debate about Toleration in the Dutch Republic," in *The Emergence of Tolerance in the Dutch Republic*, ed. C. Berkvens-Stevelinck, J. Israel, and G. H. M. Posthumus Meyjes (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 3–36.

excuse: that toleration should not be extended to those who “raise difficulties against Providence,” for this is offensive to God and harmful to civil society. Themiste argues that if this doctrine were accepted, then no Christian sect would be worthy of toleration in the eyes of other sects, since each sect accuses all the others of making God the author of sin through their differing dogmas on the will, predestination, hell, and so forth.

EMT is therefore concerned with toleration, and because Themistius was a philosopher whom Bayle admired on this subject, we can conclude that Themiste was intended to represent Themistius. Therefore, by bringing Maxime and Themiste into dialogue, Bayle was bringing the problem of evil and toleration together. Bayle might have intended nothing more than to suggest that his adversaries in the debate over the problem of evil ought to be more tolerant. Or he might have been urging a spirit of toleration more generally, in all theological disputes. However, in the next section, I argue from various texts in *EMT* that Bayle meant something much more particular and significant, namely that toleration constitutes a response to the problem of evil.

THE MESSAGE OF BAYLE’S LAST TITLE: TOLERATION AS THEODICY

In the lengthy passage quoted above that related Themistius’s discourse to Valens urging toleration, Bayle offered an explanation for why God would permit error and rational disagreement over issues relating to him, rather than granting humans omniscience and the harmony this would seem to entail. The relevant passage claims that “*each person captures some part of the truth; and it pleased God to confound men’s pride and to render himself more venerable by the difficulty we have in knowing him.*” Themistius claims that each person grasps some part of the truth, but not the whole truth, and that God’s design behind this was to humble humankind and to manifest his glory more greatly through the impossibility of understanding him. Intellectual debate about God, if it ever ended in certainty and agreement, would puff up theologians and philosophers, who could claim to know God, and therefore be equal to him in some sense. Widespread divergence of belief, on the other hand, is a sign of God’s surpassing greatness, for it shows that his nature and actions are infinitely beyond the scope of every individual, and even the whole collective, human reason. We have here an explanation of why God would desire to create humans with a

severely limited understanding: it was to confound human pride and make God's superior glory known. In his discourse to Valens, Themistius thus resembles in an important respect the Academic skeptic, Arcesilaus, of whom Bayle writes, "[o]n the whole, he acknowledged the Finger of God, in the Ignorance of Man; for he was much pleased with a Verse of Hesiod, where it is said, That *the Gods keep human Understanding behind the Veil*."⁴⁸

In *EMT* I, Bayle follows this line of thought of Themistius and Arcesilaus⁴⁹ in seeing God's hand in human ignorance. Notably, Bayle placed his clearest pronouncement in this regard into the mouth of Themiste. In response to a lengthy quotation of Le Clerc wherein Bayle's treatment of the problem of evil is made analogous to the protests of an unruly subject against his sovereign's governance, Themiste imagines in turn "an Emperor who surpasses our most able politicians to the same degree that these latter surpass school teachers. . . . He follows no example; he lays paths for government unimagined until now."⁵⁰ Foreigners, Themiste continues, complain that the sovereign departs too far from prudence, and even some of his subjects murmur behind his back that his ways are not wise. Some authors (understood to be Le Clerc and Jaquelot) try to appease the foreigners and doubtful subjects by arguing "that it is false that the conduct of the Emperor is unguided by ordinary political maxims." But because the emperor's ways differ so extremely from common experience, these authors are forced to offer unbelievable accounts of the emperor's purposes in order to relate them to ordinary human judgment. Another author (understood to be Bayle) refuses to deny appearances in order to harmonize the emperor's ways with those of lesser politicians, and "shows that we must place ourselves entirely in the hands of the wisdom of his Imperial Majesty . . . and that because his wisdom is of a degree incomparably more eminent than that of other men, his maxims should have a new character, proportionate to the exceeding superiority of the genius he possesses." Themiste concludes by arguing that the emperor would "excuse the unenlightened zeal of the first apologists, though he would mock their ignorance; and he would approve above all the last apologist."

⁴⁸ *Dictionary*, "Arcesilaus," rem. G, 411. The italics are Bayle's.

⁴⁹ There is strong evidence that Bayle desired to identify himself in *EMT* and elsewhere as an Academic skeptic, like Arcesilaus. See Lennon, "What Kind of Skeptic Was Bayle?" and José Maia Neto, "Academic Skepticism in Early Modern Philosophy," in *JHI* 58 (1997): 199–220; José Maia Neto, "Bayle's Academic Scepticism," in *Everything Connects: In Conference with Richard H. Popkin: Essays in His Honor*, ed. James E. Force and David S. Katz (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 264–76.

⁵⁰ *OD* 4: 6b. All other quotations in this paragraph share this citation.

Through this reply to Le Clerc, Themiste shows that it is Le Clerc and Jaquelot who are the displeasing subjects, while Bayle alone gives proper honor to the sovereign, God. Just as Themistius urged Valens to see that God's glory was magnified by the plurality of opinions surrounding his nature, so too Bayle, through Themiste, urges Le Clerc to see that God's glory is magnified through our failure to rationally comprehend God's goodness while taking account of the evil in the world. If the problem of evil could be resolved by means of weak human reason, God's providence would be seen as ordinary and prudent, and human reason would have occasion to boast of understanding God's ways; by denying the possibility of any comprehension whatsoever of divine providence, and by having recourse only to faith, God's genius is held above reason, and the glory is God's alone.

This explains why God would permit perpetual diversity of opinion and even error about his nature and ways. These are not seen as evil to be overcome, but as something good, part of God's providence, serving to manifest God's supremacy. This skeptical theology also paves the way for a theodicy that Bayle offers in the very next chapter of *EMT*. Bayle would seem to be the last person who would ever offer a theodicy, especially after the remarks we have just considered. However, Bayle's is not a rational, metaphysical argument of the sort Leibniz famously offered—what Kant would later call a “doctrinal theodicy”⁵¹—the offering of which would have contradicted Bayle's principles just established, but is rather an injunction to a kind of action. We might call it a “practical theodicy,” or to further anticipate the comparison with Kant, which I will soon make, an “authentic theodicy.”

Bayle introduces a distinction in what is meant by the problem of evil, and so it is appropriate that he speaks through Maxime. As Maxime notes, the moral problem of evil (which was, for Bayle, the only real problem of evil⁵²) arises when for some reason or another, God appears to be the author of sin. What Le Clerc does not realize is that there are two senses of the phrase “God is the author of sin”:

The phrase means either that we teach something which, according to our adversaries, makes God to be the author of sin, or that

⁵¹ Immanuel Kant, “On the miscarriage of all philosophical trials in theodicy,” in *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other Writings*, ed. Allen Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 24 (AK 8: 264).

⁵² See *Dictionary*, “Manichees,” rem. D: “The heavens, and the rest of the universe, declare the glory, power, and the unity of God; man alone, that masterpiece of his cre-

we confess that we ourselves make God to be the author of sin. No Christian sect teaches that God is the author of sin in the second sense, but if we believed the Roman Catholics, the Lutherans, the Arminians, etc., then we would accept as a doctrine of Calvinism that God is the author of sin. . . . [T]here is no single system which in the judgment of all the others exculpates God when his providence is judged by our ordinary methods. But on the other hand, it is admitted by every sect that no other sect establishes that God is the author of sin in the second sense.⁵³

There are two senses of the problem of moral evil introduced here: it either means (i) that when we judge the doctrines of some other sect, it seems from our perspective that *they* teach that God is the author of sin; or (ii) that we ourselves knowingly teach that God is the author of sin by our theological doctrines. Bayle appeals to common opinion (and common sense) in claiming that there is no problem of evil in the second sense. That is, no individual believers or sects of Christianity knowingly teach that God causes sin in human beings. The problem of evil arises only in the first sense, when one sect accuses another of teaching that God is the author of sin by their particular theological dogmas. No Calvinist, for example, believes that God is the author of sin; but if you ask a Catholic, then all Calvinists should believe this, for the Catholic would say that it flows logically from the pessimistic theology of Calvin. Such accusations do not result in amicable discourse or mere leisurely debate, as Maxime notes through a quotation from Bayle: “all the Christian sects that are accused of teaching that God is the author of sin defend themselves as from a horrible blasphemy and an atrocious impiety, and they complain of having been slandered diabolically.”⁵⁴ Since the accused sect feels threatened, they “recriminate against their adversaries all the same difficulties,” and the dispute is begun. The problem of evil is thus always the product of heated, intolerant theological debates.⁵⁵

Beginning with this realization, Bayle develops his theodicy of toleration. It is important to note that it is not by indifference to the opinions of

ation among things visible, Man alone, I say, affords the greatest objection against the unity of God.”

⁵³ OD 4: 10b

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ For more on how intolerance can create problems where none truly exist, see Elisabeth Labrousse, *Pierre Bayle, vol. II: Hétérodoxie et rigorisme* (La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), ch. 14: “Les querelles des théologiens,” 417–46.

one's adversaries that the problem of evil is resolved for Bayle. Such indifference would constitute a lack of appreciation of God's goodness, as Bayle explains: "It is by a lively sense of these difficulties we learn the excellency of Faith, and of this gift of God. Hereby we learn also to mistrust reason, and have recourse to grace. They who know nothing of the great contest between reason and faith, and are ignorant of the force of Philosophical objections, have but an imperfect sense of God's goodness to them, and of the manner of triumphing over all the temptations of incredulous and presumptuous reason. The true way of humbling [reason] is to know, that if it be capable of inventing objections, it is incapable of resolving them, and, in a word, that it is not by reason that the gospel was established."⁵⁶ Active disagreement with one's opponents leads to a "lively sense" of the inherent limitations of reason, and of the supremacy of faith.

So Bayle will not resolve the problem of evil by encouraging an end to theological debate in general, but only to intolerant debate. His model for how to proceed in discussions concerning the problem of evil was Melanchthon: "If [Melanchthon] rejected an opinion as false and dangerous, he did not cease being equitable toward those who upheld that opinion. . . . He had enough equity to distinguish these two things: the doctrine of Calvin as he considered it, and this same doctrine as Calvin considered it. It seemed to him that according to [Calvin's] doctrine God was the author of sin, but he knew well that Calvin did not teach it under this notion, and that considered as such, Calvin would have judged it abominable."⁵⁷ Bayle writes a few lines later of Melanchthon: "Everybody should imitate that equitable Divine."

If everybody imitated Melanchthon, there would be no theological problem of evil. This problem arises from an apparent conflict between the existence of evil and the goodness of God. In particular, it arises when a set of theological doctrines appears from a certain perspective to make God out to be the author of sin. But this conflict between evil and God's goodness arises only through accusations made amongst theologians. To be sure, in Bayle's view, evil poses a great problem for individual believers, outside of any context of theological debate, but in this case, evil does not conflict with God's goodness, but with *human reason*, and its limited, imperfect conception of God. *This* conflict—between evil and human reason—is *not* the theological problem of evil; in fact, for Bayle, it is not a problem at all; it is an excellent preparation for the necessary humbling of reason which

⁵⁶ *Dictionary*, "An Explanation Concerning the Sceptics," 5: 832.

⁵⁷ *Dictionary*, "Synergists," rem. B, 5: 153.

precedes faith. Individuals know that “[t]he best answer that can be naturally returned to the question, *Why did God permit that man should sin?* is this, *I do not know, I only believe that he had some reasons for it very worthy of his infinite wisdom, but they are incomprehensible to me.*”⁵⁸ In the absence of mutual accusations and intolerance, therefore, the theological problem of evil would not arise, though evil would continue to confront human reason as radically inexplicable. A spirit of toleration would dissolve the theological problem of evil, thus exculpating God from any role in sin, though it would do nothing to make sense of suffering or sin.

In his *Theodicy*, Leibniz takes no notice of the appeals to toleration in Bayle’s discussions of the problem of evil. Even if he had recognized them, Leibniz would not have been content with Bayle’s mere dissolution of the problem of evil through his theodicy of toleration, for Leibniz thought reason was capable of much more than this. Though in Leibniz’s view human reason cannot grasp all of God’s designs behind creating this world, reason can nevertheless fully answer every charge brought against God insinuating that he is responsible for sin. Bayle, on the other hand, held that the Manichean objections against the goodness of God were utterly unanswerable, except by appeal to faith. What would Bayle’s response to Leibniz have looked like, if he had lived to answer the *Theodicy*? While Bayle’s creativity could not have reached the heights of Voltaire’s parody, there is little question that Bayle’s response to Leibniz would have shared something of the playful spirit of *Candide*.

But the philosopher whose arguments give us the best picture of how Bayle might have responded to Leibniz’s *Theodicy* is not Voltaire, but Kant. Though interest in theodicy waned over the course of the Enlightenment (Diderot and d’Holbach had little to say about it, for example),⁵⁹ Kant was interested in theodicy from the beginning to the end of his career, since he saw it as related to questions of human moral autonomy.⁶⁰ Kant argues in remarkably Baylian fashion in his short essay, *On the miscarriage of all philosophical trials in theodicy*, that at the tribunal of human reason, God cannot be successfully defended against the charge of being responsible for human misery and sin. Or to use Kant’s terminology, human reason is incapable of inventing a successful “doctrinal theodicy” of the sort Leibniz

⁵⁸ *Dictionary*, “Paulicians,” rem. M, 4: 525.

⁵⁹ I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to my attention, and for very helpful suggestions relating to my transition from Bayle to Kant.

⁶⁰ J. B. Schneewind makes a compelling case for the link between theodicy and autonomy in Kant’s thought in *The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 492–501.

offered. The first part of the essay reads like a systematization of Bayle's *tour de force* against theodicy in the *Dictionary* articles "Manicheans" and "Paulicians." Then Kant announces that "we cannot deny the name of 'theodicy' also to the mere dismissal of all objections against divine wisdom."⁶¹ Such dissolution of the problem of evil was called by Kant "authentic theodicy." This kind of theodicy is not the product of speculative reason, but of practical reason, which can be "considered as the unmediated definition and voice of God through which he gives meaning to the letter of his creation."⁶² Kant illustrates the notion of authentic theodicy through an interpretation of the Book of Job. Job's friends are understood by Kant as attempting to offer a doctrinal theodicy of Job's suffering, and their conclusion is that Job has sinned and thus deserved his misery. Job does not argue with his friends, but responds in confidence, "Far be it from me to account you right; till I die I will not renounce my innocence. My justice I maintain and I will not relinquish it; my heart does not reproach me for any of my days."⁶³ Job cannot explain his suffering, nor will he try, for he sides in Kant's opinion with the "unconditional divine decision": "He has decided . . . he does whatever he wills."⁶⁴ Job's authentic theodicy is to trust his conscience which tells him both that he has done no wrong and that whatever God chooses is good. God's plan behind all things (including evil), which is wisdom, is inaccessible to humankind, which can gain limited insight into such lofty matters only in a negative way: "the fear of the Lord is wisdom, and avoiding evil is understanding."⁶⁵

In Bayle's masterpiece on toleration, the *Philosophical Commentary*, he never ceases to refer to conscience as the "voice of God." At the outset of the work, Bayle offers a test to decide what conscience commands us to do, a test that Jean Devolvé has likened to the formula of universality of Kant's categorical imperative.⁶⁶ In short, the test involves reflecting on whether one's proposed course of action could be adopted by any random person, living in any country, in any set of circumstances; or whether the course of action is beneficial solely to oneself, in the here and now.⁶⁷ Bayle's

⁶¹ Kant, *Religion*, 24 (AK 8: 264).

⁶² *Ibid.*, 25 (AK 8: 264).

⁶³ Job 27: 5–6; Kant, *Religion*, 26 (AK 8: 267).

⁶⁴ Job 23: 13; Kant, *Religion*, 25 (AK 8:265).

⁶⁵ Job 28: 28.

⁶⁶ Jean Devolvé, *Religion, critique, et philosophie positive chez Pierre Bayle* (Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1970), 109, 110, 421.

⁶⁷ See Pierre Bayle, *A Philosophical Commentary on These Words of the Gospel, Luke 14:23, "Compel Them to Come In, That My House May Be Full,"* ed. and intro. John Kilcullen and Chandran Kukathas (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), 69 (CP 1: ch. 1; OD 2: 369a).

argument against intolerance through Part I is that its essence is to be non-universalizable. An intolerant person does not want *every* sect to be intolerant; rather, he sees only his own sect as justified in persecuting. The upshot is that conscience, whose dictates must all be universalizable, orders us to be tolerant. This is the same as saying that God, whose voice is heard as conscience, orders toleration.⁶⁸

Bayle's theory of toleration thus resembles in important respects the authentic theodicies of Kant and Job. We have seen that intolerance is the cause of the theological problem of evil in Bayle's mind. Hence, it follows that a spirit of toleration would dissolve that problem. Moreover, because Bayle's theory of toleration rests on his view of conscience as the voice of God, and because toleration is commanded by conscience, this dissolution of the problem of evil can rightfully be considered the command of God himself. Hence, for Bayle, the problem of evil is dissolved by obeying one's conscience and refraining from intolerantly accusing others of making God the author of sin because their doctrines differ from one's own.

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⁶⁸ In *Bayle philosophe*, ch. 6, Mori argues that in his later life, Bayle abandoned his original theory of toleration. If true, this would pose a problem for my thesis. However, see Michael W. Hickson and Thomas M. Lennon, "The Real Significance of Bayle's Authorship of the *Avis*," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 17 (2009): 191–205, which argues that Mori's interpretation of the evolution of Bayle's thought on toleration is itself problematic.